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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-PROVINCE OF LEGIS-
LATUR.-Defendant, who was convicted of the unlawful transportation of
"moonshine," was given the maximum sentence by the jury. On appeal he con-
tended that the punishment was excessive. Held, that since fixing the punish-
ment for crime is a legislative and not a judicial function, appellate courts can
not adjudge as excessive a punishment which is within the range prescribed by
statute. State v. Wheeler, 2 S. W. (2d) 777 (Mo., 1928).
The eighth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides against cruel and
unusual punishment. This provision has reference only to federal statutes
and does not apply to state statutes establishing punishment for crimes. Com-
nonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N. E. 504; Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga.
796, 67 S. E. 101. Most states have in their bill of rights clauses similar to the
federal amendment. Article 2, Section 25 of the Missouri Constitution is such
a provision, and is the one sought to be invoked in the principal case in an effort
to have the punishment adjudicated excessive, on the ground that it was cruel and
unusual. But such a prohibition has reference only to the statutes fixing the
punishment and not to the punishment assessed by the jury or court within the
limits of the statute. If the statute is not in violation of the constitution then
any punishment assessed within the limits of such statute can not be adjudged
excessive. State v. Alexander, 315 Mo. 199, 285 S. W. 984; State v. Van Wye,
136 Mo. 227, 37 S. W. 938; Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N. E. 894; Common-
wealth v. Murphy, supra; State v. Davis, 88 S. C 229, 70 S. E. 811. The term
cruel and unusual punishment means that the mode of punishment is of a
barbarous character and unknown to the common law. State v. Williams, 77
Mo. 310; State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429. "It devolves upon the legislature to
fix the punishment for crime and in the exercise of their judgment great lati-
tude must be allowed and courts may reasonably interfere only when the pun-
ishment is so unreasonable or so cruel as to meet the disapproval and condemna-
tion of the conscience and reason of men generally." State v. Becker, 3 S. D.
29, 51 N. W. 1018.
In the principal case the constitutionality of the statute under which the de-
fendant was convicted was not questioned. Therefore, in the light of the
authorities above cited, the Missouri Supreme Court properly refused to go into
the question of excessive punishment so long as such punishment was within that
prescribed by the limits of the statute. R. B. S., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--STATUTE REGULATING ADMISSION TO BAR.-Appellant,
a member of the Philadelphia Bar, and a resident of Delaware County, applied
to the board of law examiners of that county for the purpose of becoming en-
rolled as a member of the Delaware County Bar. The Court rule provided that
"an applicant for admission to the bar of Delaware County shall make a formal
declaration in writing that he intends permanently to practice in that county, and
within three months to open his principal office there. . ." Olmstead did not
state his intention to open his principal office in Delaware County and his ap-
plication was refused. Held, that the rule of the court was binding upon all ap-
plicants, notwithstanding that a statute literally construed, apparently provided
to the contrary. In re Olmstead, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928).
The judicial departments of the respective states have sagaciously sustained
the constitutionality of statutes providing reasonable requirements for admission
to the bar. Such action has been based upon the sensible attitude of the courts
to avoid friction with the legislative department, and a recognition of the police
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